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COMMENTS
TIE "INVESTIGATORY FILES" EXEMPTION TO THI FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT
Weisberg v. U.S. Department of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195
(D.C. Cir. 1973)
Appellant Weisberg, author of a series of books on political assassi-
nations, sought disclosure of the spectrographic analyses' compiled by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) during its investigation of
the assassination of President Kennedy. After exhausting administra-
tive remedies,2 Weisberg sued to compel disclosure pursuant to the
Freedom of Information Act.3  The Department of Justice contended
that the records were investigatory files compiled for law enforcement
purposes and exempt from disclosure under the statute.4 The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia5 held: Records properly classi-
1. Appellant sought "[s]pectrographic analysis of bullet, fragments of bullet and
other objects, including garments and part of vehicle and curbstone said to have been
struck by bullet and/or fragments during assassination of President Kennedy and
wounding of Governor Connally." Weisberg v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195,
1197 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974). Spectrographic analysis
is a common scientific technique by which the precise composition of minute quantities
of material can be determined. Bullet and bullet fragments can be determined to be
from a particular batch from a specific manufacturer. Brief for Appellant, App. at 2,
Weisberg v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra.
2. Weisberg repeatedly sought release of the information orally and in writing, for
a period of four years before initiation of this action. Brief for Appellant, App. at 3-
27, Weisberg v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Exhaustion
of administrative remedies is required under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.
1 552 (1970). See, e.g., Tuchinsky v. Selective Serv. Sys., 294 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Ill.),
aff'd, 418 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1969).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
4. Id. § 552(b) provides:
This section does not apply to matters that are-
(7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to
the extent available by law to a party other than an agency;
5. The district court dismissed without opinion, but a three-judge panel of the court
of appeals remanded, stating that the agency had not sustained the burden of proving
either specific harm as a result of disclosure or anticipated use of the file for law en-
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fled as investigatory files are exempt from public disclosure, even after
enforcement proceedings are no longer contemplated, without proof
that disclosure would result in specific harm to the investigatory
function.8
The first statutory plan to provide public access to governmental in-
formation, section three of the Administrative Procedure Act,7 proved
largely ineffectual. 8 The Freedom of Information Act,O passed in 1966
after a decade of congressional inquiry, 10 was an attempt -to create an
forcement purposes. The instant decision was rendered by the court of appeals on re-
hearing en banc. A petition for a second rehearing en banc was denied. The Supreme
Court denied certiorari. 416 U.S. 993 (1974).
1 6. Weisberg v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 993 (1974).
7. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946). Section 3,
entitled "Public Information," exempted from disclosure records "requiring secrecy in
the public interest" or "relating solely to the internal management of an agency," final
opinions and orders required "for good cause to be held confidential," and official rec-
ords sought by persons not "properly and directly concerned." There was no remedy
provided for an individual wrongly denied access to the Government's records.
8. Agencies used the ambiguous language of the statute to withhold information
generally. In a frequently cited example, the Secretary of the Navy ruled that "tele-
phone directories fall in the category of information relating to the internal management
of the Navy," citing § 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act as statutory authority.
H.R. REP. No. 1257, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 77-82 (1962). In addition to executive clas-
sifications such as 'Top Secret," "Secret," and "Confidential," used in matters of na-
tional defense, twenty-four separate terms were created ranging from a succinct "Non-
public" to an imposing "Limitation on Availability of Equipment Files for Public Ref-
erence." H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1965). The Senate Committeo
on the Judiciary stated:
It is the conclusion of the committee that the present section of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act is of little or no value to the public gaining access to
the records of the Federal Government. Indeed, it has precisely the opposite
effect: it is cited as statutory authority for the withholding of virtually any
piece of information that an official or an agency does not wish to disclose.
S. REp. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965) [hereinafter cited as SuNATn REPORT].
For further criticism of the Act, see H.R. REP. No. 918, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1963).
See also Katz, The Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek Under the Freedom of In-
formation Act, 48 TEXAS L. Rav. 1261 (1970); Moss, Public Information Policies, the
APA, and Executive Privilege, 15 AD. L. Rav. 111 (1963); Comment, The Freedom of
Information Act: Access to Law, 36 FOiHrAm L. Rv. 765 (1968); Note, Freedom of
Information: The Statute and the Regulations, 56 GEo. I. 18 (1967).
9. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No.
90-23, § 1, 81 Stat. 54). The major changes incorporated in the Act were (1) providing
access to any person, (2) shifting the burden of proof to the agency to justify nondis-
closure, (3) providing district court de novo review when exemptions are granted, and
(4) creating specific exemptions from disclosure.
10. See generally Hearings on S. 1160, S. 1336, S. 1758, and S. 1879 Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on thehttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss3/3
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enforceable right of access to the records of government agencies.
To implement this purpose, the Act was designed to provide mandatory
disclosure, limited only as "specifically stated" in nine exemptions."
The seventh exemption, section 552(b)(7), protects "investigatory
files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent avail-
able by law to a party other than an agency."'12 Although this exemp-
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); Hearings on HR. 5012-21, 5237, 5406, 5520,
5583, 6172, 6739, 7010, and 7161, Federal Public Records Law, Before the Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on Governmental Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); Hear-
ings on S. 1663, Administrative Procedure Act, Before the Subcomm. on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1964); Hearings on Government Information, Plans and Policies, Before a Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); Hearings
on S. 1160 and S. 1663, Freedom of Information, Before a Subcomm. on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963); Hearings on S. 921, Freedom of Information and Secrecy in Government, Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
11. See H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) [hereinafter cited as
HOUSE REPORT]; SENATE REPORT. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970) provides:
This section does not apply to matters that are-
(1) spec:fically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the in-
terest of the national defense or foreign policy;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financal information obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not
be available by law to a party other than an agency in litgation with an agency;
(6) personnel and med'cal files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to
the extent avalable by law to a party other than an agency;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports
prepated by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the
regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, con-
cerning wells.
Section (c) of the Act states that the Act "does not authorize withholding of informa-
tion or limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated in this
section." Id. § 552(c) (1970) (emphasis added). See generally Note, The Freedom of
Information Act-The Parameters of the Exemptions, 62 GEo. L.J. 177 (1973).
12. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (1970). The phrase "except to the extent available by
law to a party other than an agency" underwent several changes during the legislative
debate and codification. See S. REP. No. 248, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1967); H.R.
REP. No. 125, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1967). The phrase is capable of two interpre-
tations: (1) records available by law to any individual must be disclosed to the public,
and (2) any independent right of access to a litigant is merely preserved by the clause.
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tion was included in the Act to prevent the compromise of government
investigations and enforcement proceedings,' its vague language"4 and
cursory and conflicting legislative history'r have forced the courts to de-
The first alternative is advocated in Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analy-
sis, 34 U. Cur. L. REv. 761, 800 (1967), reprinted and updated, K. DAvis, ADMiNISTRA-
TiVE LAw TRATIsE § 3A (3d ed. 1972); the second alternative is adopted by the U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION
SECTIoN OF THE ADmINISTRATIvE PROCEDUE ACT I1, at 307 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as ATT'Y GEN. MEMO.]. The former interpretation would provide public access to all
discoverable documents, while the latter would operate in the manner of the Jencks Act,
18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970), permitting discovery by a litigant but not requiring public
disclosure.
Weisberg contended that had Lee Harvey Oswald lived he would have had a legal
right to the spectrographic analyses, and thus Weisberg was entitled to disclosure as a
matter of right. The appellate court rejected the argument, construing the phrase to
grant a right "only to the extent that the wanted material could have been 'available
by law' and then only to himself as a party. . . ." 489 F.2d at 1203 n.15.
13. "These are files prepared by government agencies to prosecute law violators.
The disclosure of such files, except to the extent they are available by law to a private
party, could harm the government's case in court." SENATE REPORT 11. The House
reiterated this purpose, but expanded law enforcement to cover "investigatory files re-
lated to enforcement of all kinds of laws, labor and securities as well as criminal laws."
HousE REPORT 7-11. Courts and commentators have agreed with the House that the
exemption covers law enforcement activities of every nature, administrative as well as
criminal. See, e.g., Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Clement Bros.
Co. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1969); Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271
F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967); A'rr'y GEN. MEMO. at 38; K. DAvis, supra note 12, § 3A.2.
See also note 15 infra.
14. The entire Freedom of Information Act has been vigorously attacked as being
so poorly drafted that agencies can employ the confusing legislative history and ambig-
uous language to circumvent the disclosure purpose of the Act. See generally H.R. REP.
No. 92-1419, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1972); Fellmuth, The Freedom of Information
Act and the Federal Trade Commission: A Study in Malfeasance, 4 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-
Civ. LIB. L. REv. 345 (1969); Huard, The 1966 Public Information Act: An Appraisal
Without Enthusiasm, 2 PUB. CONTRACT L.J. 213 (1969); Katz, supra note 8; Nader,
Freedom of Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5 HARv. Civ. RiouTs-CrV. LIn.
L. REv. 1 (1970).
15. Compare SENATE REPORT with HoUsE REPORT. The conflict over the interpre-
tation of § (b) (7) is accentuated by the cursory treatment in the House and Senate
Reports. See HoUsE REPORT 11; SENATE REPORT 9. Under the Senate view, an agency
seemingly would have to intend to prosecute, but not under the House approach. A
more explicit tentative draft of the exemption stated that files were exempted only "until
they are used in or affect an action or proceeding or a private party's effective participa-
tion therein." 110 CONG. REc. 17666-68 (1964).
The Attorney General's Memorandum adopts the view of the House Report, and is
most often relied on by the agencies, presumably because the Department of Justice
functions as the attorney for the agencies in litigation. The Senate Report has been
characterized as the more faithful to congressional intent. See Getman v. NLRB, 450
F.2d 670, 673 n.8 (D.C. Cir.), stay denied, 404 U.S. 1204 (1971); Benson v. General
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss3/3
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fine its substantive meaning and application. Since a broad reading
of the exemption might defeat the disclosure purpose of the statute,"'
the courts have attempted to impose limitations on the protection
afforded by the exemption. The two approaches' 7 used by the circuit
courts to give meaning to the section reflect disagreement over the pur-
pose of the exemption, 8 and have resulted in conflicting decisions.' 9
Under the temporal approach, adopted in the District of Columbia
and Fourth Circuits,20 the courts have viewed the purpose of the
seventh exemption as prevention of premature disclosure of the
Government's case in court.2' Thus, when the investigation and
Servs. Administration, 415 F.2d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 1969); Tax Analysts & Advocates
v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1304 (D.D.C. 1973); Consumers Union of the United States
v. Veterans Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796, 801 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed as
moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971); Davis, supra note 12, at 763:
In general, the Senate Committee is relatively faithful to the words of the Act,
and the House Committee ambitiously undertakes to change the meaning that
appears in the Act's words. The main thrust of the House Committee remarks
is always in the direction of nondisclosure.
16. K. DAvis, supra note 12, § 3A.1.
17. See notes 21 & 28 infra and accompanying text.
18. In Cowles Communication, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726, 727
(N.D. Cal. 1971), the court stated:
If [Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970), Wellford v.
Hardin, 315 F. Supp. 175 (D. Md. 1970), and Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding &
Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1968)] are authority for the propo-
sition that any investigatory file becomes the subject of private discovery when
it is demonstrated that the file will not be used in a law enforcement proceed-
ing, then I do not follow them. The language of the Act is clear. It protects
investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes. A file is no less
compiled for law enforcement purposes because after the compilation it is de-
cided for some reason there will be no law enforcement proceeding. I think
no resort to legislative history is needed to clarify what the language of the
Act itself makes clear. But if the legislative history is considered, in my opin-
ion it confirms the existence of the privilege.
19. Compare Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971), and Bristol-Myers
v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970), with SEC v.
Rankel, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 73 (1972), and Evans v. Depart-
ment of Transp., 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972).
20. Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971); Bristol-Myers v. FTC, 424
F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
21. Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir.), stay denied, 404 U.S. 1204
(1971); Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971); Bristol-Myers v. FTC, 424
F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970); accord, Philadelphia News-
papers, Inc. v. HUD, 343 F. Supp. 1176 (E.D. Pa. 1972); M.A. Shapiro & Co. v. SEC,
339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972); Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F.
Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1968); see Clement Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir.
1969) (documents obtained by NLRB in investigation of alleged unfair labor practice
not disclosed to employer in pending proceeding); Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton,
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enforcement proceeding for which the records were compiled have
concluded, or if there is no realistic prospect of an enforcement pro-
ceeding, the records cease to be protected. In Bristol-Myers v. FTC,22
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated that the district court
must determine "whether the prospect of enforcement proceedings
[was] concrete enough to bring into operation the exemption for
investigatory files, and if so whether the particular documents sought
by the company [were] nevertheless discoverable."23  The Fourth
Circuit concluded in Wellford v. Hardin24 that since the purpose of the
exemption was "to prevent premature discovery by a defendant in an
enforcement proceeding,"25 records of past enforcement proceedings
were not exempted even if included in current investigatory files. 26
In the second approach, a functional analysis employed by the
Second and Fifth Circuits, 27 the courts have read the purpose of the
271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967) (investigatory files compiled by NLRB for unfair labor
practice hearing exempted to protect pending litigation and names of employees provid-
ing information).
22. 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
23. Id. at 939-40.
24. 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971). A case of the same style and substantially similar
facts was before the District Court for the District of Columbia. Although the court
granted access to some of the requested documents, it refused to disclose information
containing the names of companies previously cited for violations of Department of Ag-
riculture pesticide regulations despite conclusion of the litigation. Wellford v. Hardin,
315 F. Supp. 768 (D.D.C. 1970).
25. 444 F.2d at 23.
26. Id. at 24-25. Wellford indicates that the exemptions as "specifically stated" are
the statutory limit on nondisclosure, accord, Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 677 (D.C.
Cir.), stay denied, 404 U.S. 1204 (1971); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), and the scope of the exemptions cannot be enlarged through the exercise
of equity jurisdiction. See Wellman Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 427, 429 (4th Cir.
1973); Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1973); Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d
787, 792 n.4 (6th Cir. 1972); Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657, 661-
62 (6th Cir. 1972). Contra, Benson v. General Servs. Administration, 415 F.2d 878,
880 (9th Cir. 1969); Consumers Union of the United States v. Veterans Administration,
301 F. Supp. 796, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d
Cir. 1971).
The balancing of interests was one of the loopholes in the 1946 version of the Act
since rarely will an individual's interest outweigh that of the Government. The commit-
tee reports give some evidence that a congressional balancing was used when drafting
the Act, thus preempting judicial equity jurisdiction. HousE REPORT 6; SENATE REPORT
3. A more recent report criticizes judicial balancing. H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 76-77 (1972).
27. SEC v. Frankel, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 73 (1972);
Evans v. Department of Transp., 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
918 (1972).
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exemption as protection of agency investigatory techniques and the
identity of informants.28 Under this rationale, investigatory files are
protected even after the termination of enforcement proceedings be-
cause compelled disclosure might impair future law enforcement
efforts. The Fifth Circuit, in Evans v. Department of Transportation,2 9
exempted from disclosure files that would reveal the name of an
informant in a case that had appeared before the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration eleven years earlier."0 In SEC v. Frankel,31 the Second
Circuit refused disclosure of an investigatory file compiled by the SEC
despite resolution of the proceedings in a consent decree. The court
noted that the SEC relied on the voluntary cooperation of informants,
and disclosure would thus hinder the law enforcement function of the
agency.82
In Weisberg v. U.S. Department of Justice,33 the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals foreclosed either a temporal or a functional approach
by restricting judicial review to a determination of whether the records 4
were properly classified. 35 The court did not discuss Bristol-Myers and,
28. SEC v. Frankel, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 73 (1972);
Evans v. Department of Transp., 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
918 (1972); Cowles Communications, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726
(N.D. Cal. 1971).
29. 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972).
30. After in camera inspection, the court released all but one document containing
an informant's name. Id. at 825. The court also relied on § (b) (3), which exempts
from disclosure information protected by another statute. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)
(1970). 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (1970) requires secrecy for information concerning the
safety of airline passengers.
31. 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 73 (1972), noted in 51 TExAs
L. REv. 119 (1972).
32. 460 F.2d at 817. In Frankel, the investigatory file was in excess of 7,000 pages.
The entire file was exempted despite the fact that the names of the witnesses sought
to be protected had already been disclosed. Id. at 819 n.3 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
Compare Frankel with Welford v. Hardin, 441 F.2d 21, 24 (4th Cir. 1971) in which
the court stated that since all possible defendants had access to the documents sought,
protection of investigatory techniques or informants was inapposite.
33. 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974).
34. Throughout the opinion the court, somewhat misleadingly, referred to the spec-
trographic analyses sought by Weisberg as materials or "records" (court's quotation
marks). In fact, the actual physical evidence from which the reports were compiled
was never requested, and appellant did not seek to conduct tests on the materials them-
selves. See note 1 supra. In Nichols v. United States, 460 F.2d 671 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 966 (1972), the petitioner sought the actual evidence of the Kennedy
assassination in order to conduct neutron activation analysis, a similar but more sophis-
ticated technique than spectrographic analysis. The court denied disclosure since physi-
cal evidence is not discoverable under the Act.
35. Section (a) (3) of the Act authorizes the district court to determine de novo
469
Washington University Open Scholarship
470 WASIHNGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1974:463
although the Frankel decision was cited as authority,86 the court did not
attempt a functional analysis. Rather, the court cited EPA v. Mink,87 in
which the Supreme Court, denying disclosure under subsection (b) (1) ,8
stated that executive security classifications would not be subjected to
judicial scrutinys9 and specifically rejected the use of in camera inspec-
tion.40 Thus, the court in Weisberg, documenting the massive investiga-
that the information is within one of the exemptions. Most courts have determined
through in camera inspection that records were properly classified as exempt. See note
40 infra. In Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826-27 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 977 (1974), the court of appeals stated that conclusory and generalized allega-
tions would not be sufficient, particularly where exemption was sought for a large quan-
tity of material under three separate exemptions. The court remanded for in camera
inspection to separate and disclose factual material not protected by the claimed ex-
emption.
Crucial to the determination is whether records not otherwise entitled to protection
are exempted solely by their presence among legitimately classified records. "Comming-
ling," i.e. innocently or ingenuously placing documents not compiled for law enforce-
ment purposes, or otherwise not privileged, in an investigatory file, has been cited by
commentators as a present loophole in the statute. See generally Fellmuth, supra note
14; Katz, supra note 8; Nader, supra note 14.
36. 489 F.2d at 1199. The opinion cites Bristol-Myers only in passing, and not in
the context of the proper approach to the § (b) (7) exemption. Id.
37. 410 U.S. 73 (1973), rev'g, 464 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia had reversed and remanded to the district court for
in camera inspection to determine
whether, and to what extent, the file contains documents that are now within
the umbrella of a secret file but which would not have been independently clas-
sified as secret. Such documents are not entitled to the secrecy exemption of
subdivision (b)(1) solely by virtue of their association with separately clas-
sified documents.
464 F.2d at 746. The court applied the same criteria to § (b) (5). See note 57 infra.
38. For the text of § (b)(1), see note 11 supra.
39. 410 U.S. 73, 84 (1973). The Court stated that Congress intended the test for
exemption under § (b) (1) "to be simply whether the President has determined by Ex-
ecutive Order that particular documents are to be kept secret." Id. at 82. In Mink,
there was no factual dispute that the records had been so classified by Executive Order.
40. In camera inspection has been used consistently by the courts in making judg-
ments on disclosure and in determining proper classification. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484
F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974); Fisher v. Renegotiation
Bd., 473 F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Sterling Drug Co. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Evans v. Department
of Transp., 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972); Grumman
Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Bristol-Myers
v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970); Ackerly v. Ley,
420 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Williams v. IRS, 345 F. Supp. 591 (D. Del. 1972)
(in camera inspection granted at request of plaintiff); M.A. Shapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339
F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972); Cowles Communications, Inc. v. Department of Justice,
325 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Cal. 1971). But see EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973); Ep-
stein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970) (refused in
camera inspection for information sought to be withheld under § (b) (1)).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss3/3
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tion launched by the FBI in the wake of the Kennedy assassination, 4'
"deem[ed] it demonstrated beyond peradventure" that the FBI files were
investigatory and compiled for law enforcement purposes,42 and "as
such, [were] exempted from the disclosure sought to be compelled." 4
The decision in Weisberg represents a significant departure from the
District of Columbia Circuit's prior decisions under the ACt,4" particu-
The House of Representatives recently passed a bill to amend the Act. H.R. 12471,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The bill would amend § (a) of the Act to authorize in
camera review of records under any of the exemptions in § (b), including classified doc-
uments under § (b) (1). See note 61 infra and accompanying text.
41. Quoting from the Foreword to the Warren Commission Report, the court noted
that the FBI conducted 25,000 interviews and filed 2,300 reports totalling more than
25,400 pages in the course of its investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy.
489 F.2d at 1198.
42. Id. Weisberg also contended that the FBI would have been without jurisdiction
to initiate an enforcement proceeding since in 1963 it was not a federal offense to assas-
sinate a President. See Act of Aug. 28, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-141, 79 Stat. 580 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 1751 (1970)). See also Exec. Order No. 11130, 28 Fed. Reg. 12789
(1963) (created Warren Commission). The court, however, stated that the President
could authorize the FBI to initiate investigations and cooperate in law enforcement pro-
ceedings with state authorities. 489 F.2d at 1197-98.
43. 489 F.2d at 1197. In dissent, Chief Judge Bazelon acknowledged that the re-
quested records were investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes, but ar-
gued that, without evidence of specific harm or pending law enforcement proceedings,
conclusory labelling defeated the disclosure purpose of the Act. Reiterating the test ad-
ministered in Bristol-Myers, see note 23 supra and accompanying text, he advocated in
camera inspection to determine if the records were discoverable.
In camera inspection was also urged since portions of the spectrographic analyses had
been published in the Warren Commission Report. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT's Com-
MISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY 77, 84-85, 91-95, 116
(1964). In American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Gulick, 411 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1969), the
court held that the Government waived its right to claim an exemption under § (b) (5),
see note 56 infra, if it publicly relied upon the records sought to be disclosed. It is
questionable whether this reasoning would compel disclosure of the spectrographic anal-
yses in Weisberg. Despite government reliance on the Warren Commission Report, the
records sought in Weisberg had not been employed as a final order by an agency, as
had the records in Gulick. Furthermore, the two cases involved different exemptions.
44. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has consistently interpreted the Act
to facilitate disclosure. See, e.g., Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(burden on agency to provide specific justification for nondisclosure); Vaughn v. Rosen,
484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974) (burden on agency
to justify nondisclosure; in camera inspection to sever disclosable documents); Grum-
man Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 482 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (disclo-
sure under § (b) (5) exemption not contrary to policy of exemption); National Cable
Television Ass'n. v. FCC, 479 F.2d 183 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (agency must share burden
of identifying records sought); Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 473 F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (in camera review by district court to determine disclosure); Sterling Drug Co.
v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir, 1971) (in camera inspection to determine discoverabil-
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larly the court's interpretation of the subsection (b)(7) exemption in
Bristol-Myers.45 The failure of the court to discuss Bristol-Myers and
its stated reliance on Frankel leave the proper construction of subsec-
tion (b)(7) open to several interpretations." The court may have
overruled Bristol-Myers sub silentio, and accepted the functional analy-
sis utilized by the Second Circuit as the correct approach. 4T Unlike
the Frankel decision, however, which applied the functional analysis
to the specific records sought,4 8 the court in Weisberg did not demon-
strate how disclosure of the records sought by Weisberg would
prejudice agency procedures or informants' confidentiality." The
spectrographic analyses, specific identifiable scientific records, 0 seem
ity after deletions); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir.), stay denied, 404 U.S.
1204 (1971) (documents discoverable unless protected as specifically stated in exemp-
tions); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (documents of executive office
discoverable after in camera inspection); Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotia-
tion Bd., 425 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (in camera inspection to determine if records
properly classified under § (b)(4)); Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(in camera inspection to determine if medical records were properly classified under §
(b)(6) ); American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Gulick, 411 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (§ (b)
(5) documents not exempt if publicly declared to be basis for agency action).
45. Compare Weisberg v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, - U.S. - (1974), with Bristol-Myers v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
46. The court stated: "We need only surmise the consequences to law enforcement
if any 'person,' knowing full well that an investigation has been conducted, can ask some
federal court to compel disclosure of the Bureau's files." 489 F.2d at 1201. Continued
emphasis on the fact that the files in question were FBI files may indicate that the court
believed FBI records should be accorded a higher standard of protection. The legislative
history does not support this interpretation, although FBI files are mentioned as exam-
ples in the legislative reports. HousE REPORT 2; SENATE REPORT 3. In Stern v. Rich-
ardson, 367 F. Supp. 1316 (D.D.C. 1973), decided while the Weisberg en banc decision
was pending, the court ruled against the Government on the § (b) (7) exemption after
viewing the documents in camera.
47. In subsequent cases, the court has treated Bristol-Myers only in Aspin v. Laird,
491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The court there distinguished Bristol-Myers on its facts
and limited its future application to situations where no law enforcement proceeding was
contemplated and none had been conducted in the past. Id. at 29. For additional cases
see note 59 infra.
48. SEC v. Frankel, 460 F.2d 813, 818 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 73 (1972).
49. See notes 31-32, 36 supra and accompanying text. In Weisberg the court ex-
pressed only a general concern for the protection of FBI f.les. 489 F.2d at 1201. See
also note 46 supra.
50. The records sought must be identified with such specificity that the agency can
produce them without inordinate difficulty. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (1970). See Grum-
man Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 482 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Na-
tional Cable Television Ass'n v. FCC, 479 F.2d 183 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Irons v. Schuyler,
465 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972).
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unlikely to contain such information, and their use in an enforcement
proceeding seems even less likely.5"
A second interpretation of the Weisberg decision is that the court
adopted a literal approach to the subsection (b)(7) exemption, i.e.
once a court has determined that the records are properly classified as
investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes, the exemp-
tion attaches.52 This interpretation is supported by the court's reliance
on EPA v. Mink, 3 since parallel reasoning applied to subsection
(b)(7) would obviate either a temporal or functional approach. In
Mink, the records sought to be withheld under the subsection (b)()
exemption, which protects information required to be kept secret in the
interest of national defense or foreign policy, 54 were given a blanket
immunity following classification by Executive Order. The Supreme
Court stated that in camera inspection would not be employed to de-
termine if records were properly classified under subsection (b) (1).11
The Court, however, afforded different treatment to the internal mem-
oranda sought to be withheld under subsection (b)(5), 56 remanding
to the district court for an in camera determination that the records
were properly exempt. 5T The Weisberg court characterized in camera
review as permissible, not mandatory, but declined to inspect the docu-
ments.58
Weisberg has been consistently cited as precedent in subsequent
cases for a literal reading of subsection (b)(7). 59 The elimination of
51. Courts have employed in camera inspection to separate specific, discoverable
documents included in a larger record protected by an exemption. See, e.g., Vaughn
v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974); notes 40 &
43 supra.
52. See note 59 infra.
53. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
54. See note 11 supra.
55. See note 39 supra.
56. For the text of § (b)(5), see note 11 supra.
57. Under § (b)(5), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has consistently
employed in camera inspection to determine if nondisclosure was justifiable. See
Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974);
Sterling Drug Co. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d
1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Bristol-Myers v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 824 (1970); Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1969); American Mail
Line, Ltd. v. Gulick, 411 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
58. 489 F.2d at 1203.
59. Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Center for Nat'l Policy Review v. Weinberger, Civil No. 73-1090
(D.C. Cir., May 21, 1974); Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1974), peti-
tion for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. May 28, 1974) (No. 1780); Aspin v.
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a temporal or functional approach to the exemption effectively confines
the judicial function under the Act to acquiescence in agency label-
ing.60 On November 21, 1974, amendments to the Act were passed
over the veto of President Ford.6' Concerning subsection (b) (7), the
conference report specifically noted that the exception for investigative
techniques and procedures "should not be interpreted to include routine
techniques and procedures already well known to the public, such as
ballistics tests, fingerprinting, and other scientific tests or commonly
known techniques." 62 It remains to be seen whether the newest amend-
ments will avert the impact of Weisberg and ensure public access to
government-held information.
Laird, 491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1974). But see Black v. Sheraton, 371 F. Supp, 97
(D.D.C. 1974) (despite disposition of Weisberg, court cites Bristol-Myers as controlling
authority).
60. Conclusory labelling, or the danger thereof, has been criticized. See 489 F.2d
at 1206 (Bazelon, C.I., dissenting); Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974); Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
61. Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2(b), 88 Stat. 1561, amending
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970). Subsection (b) (7) was amended to read as follows:
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only
to the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with
enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or
an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of
a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a
criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security
intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only by the con-
fidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F)
endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel;
U.S. CODE CONG. & A. NEWS, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5761 (Dec. 15, 1974).
62. S. CONF. RaP. No. 93-1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1974).
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